

A Screeching Noise Across The Paddocks The Camp Mountain Train Crash of 1947


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A survey to connect the Samford Valley with Brisbane was first made in 1885. Several proposals were put to Parliament for the route of the proposed line including via Normanby, Paddington, and Mayne Junction. The line via Normanby would have been the most direct route, and approximated the length of Kelvin Grove Road today. However, the expense of building a tunnel beneath Kelvin Grove school saw this route rejected. The railway line was to be built under a guarantee arrangement whereby the local Shire or Divisional Boards contributed towards recovering the loss on a railway and a share in the profit (if one was made). Approval was given in 1895 for a railway to run to Enoggera.

The line was chosen to serve the sales yards at Newmarket and was constructed to run in a circular direction from town via Mayne Junction. Construction work finally began on 24 November 1897. Vallely and Bowser were awarded the contract for £19 049. The line opened through to Enoggera in February of 1899.

The Windsor Town Council however found itself saddled with a railway that was a loss-making concern. At one time, in the hope of turning a profit, conversion of the railway into an electric tramway was considered. Approval was given in 1912 to conduct a survey beyond Enoggera station.



The Camp Mountain train crash, Monday, 5 May 1947.

The survey took four years to finalise. The Commonwealth Government asked that the extension beyond Enoggera be deviated to serve the Rifle Range at Gaythorne and indicated its willingness to contribute £4000 towards deviating the line. With the outbreak of the Great War, approval was given to construct a line into the Enoggera Army Base in May 1915.

The extension to the Rifle Range was opened to traffic in February 1916. In 1917 approval was given to complete the railway through to Samford. From the Rifle Range the line would head in a north-westerly direction, cross the race track at Mitchelton (now the football oval), before heading further in a north-westerly direction.

The first stage of the extension was opened to Mitchelton in 1918. Day labour was provided on the extension and the YMCA looked after the creature comforts of the workers. The major engineering work was the bridge over Pickering Street at Gaythorne. Samford was reached in June 1918, and a further extension of the line was provided to Dayboro in 1920. In that same year a turning triangle or fork line was built to turn tender engines on Mitchelton services.

On 29 June 1918 the railway officially opened the extra fourteen kilometres to Samford. Opening the railway to this town, after so many years, was a major event for the people of the surrounding valley. A special train brought the Acting Railway Minister, John Hunter—along with several hundred passengers—to Samford, where it broke through a special ribbon stretched across the line and held by two old residents, John Fitzgerald and Mark Pedvell.

This opening was reported in the *Brisbane Courier* on Monday 1 July 1918:

After many years of waiting, Samford, an historical and picturesque district that surrounds it, have a railway in operation. The formal ceremony of declaring the line to be open was performed on Saturday by the Acting Minister for Railways, (Mr. Hunter). The section of the Enoggera to Terror's Creek extension thus inaugurated being that from Mitchelton to Samford. A special train left the Central Station early in the afternoon, carrying several hundred passengers—whose numbers were augmented at each station, and the country en route, and particularly the more undulating and broken regions approaching the present terminus, were greatly admired by them. The train was greeted with cheers at Samford by a large gathering of residents and the applause was renewed as the engine was driven through a ribbon held by two old identities—Messrs. John Fitzgerald and Mark Pedwell. At the invitation of the Member for the district (Mr. H. K Sizer), Mr Hunter formally declared the line open and a company of perhaps 500 persons was then entertained at a dinner at which Councillor Gilliland (Chairman of the Pine Shire Council) presided. The length of the Enoggera to Terror's Creek line when completed will be 21 miles 37 chains.¹

The Chair of the Shire, Mr Gilliland, predicted that Samford would become an important residential area with the arrival of the railway; however, thirty-seven years later, the railway closed.

Dayboro, in those days of steam trains and rail motors, was still very much a small rural town, with its own butter factory and sawmill. It would have made more sense to construct a new railway to Dayboro from Petrie. Since the 1880s the farmers of the Samford district had been campaigning vigorously to obtain rail connection with Brisbane. However it was not until 1912 that a detailed survey was run out from Enoggera to Terror's Creek (Dayboro), and not until 1916 that it was completed. Extending the line from Enoggera entailed crossing broken country, with a short tunnel beyond Samford.

Quite a number of homes had been built beyond Enoggera since 1914, when Parliament actually approved the railway line.

Construction was by day labour with men employed directly by the Railway Department. The railway opened to Mitchelton on 2 March 1918, then on 29 June 1918 the railway officially opened the extra fourteen kilometres to Samford. Construction continued towards Terror's Creek and the line opened to Samonsvale on 3 March 1919, to Kobble on 3 November 1919 and finally Dayboro on 25 September 1920.

An extension beyond Dayboro to the Mount Pleasant area was investigated back in 1916. This was primarily at the agitation of the Mount Pleasant Progress Association. The surveyor who looked at the most practicable route to construct a railway found one would have been available with some heavy grades or climbs but no major earthworks, except for a cutting seventy metres long. The line, if built, would have brought 7 500 hectares of State Forest closer to rail connection, and the survey was extended another fourteen kilometres to the Mount Mee area.

Passenger numbers peaked at 10 000 journeys per year in 1923, but in 1930 fell back to just under a thousand. During the Second World War, with the use of a railmotor, numbers rose again to six thousand. Goods traffic amounted to about one thousand tons outward, and two thousand tons inwards annually; two thirds of that being timber. The rail motor service ran six days a week, and took two hours and ten minutes for the journey from Dayboro to Central. The mixed train, hauling passengers and goods, took three and a half hours. Much of the timber cut from the local area found its way into the many sawmills that were dotted alongside the railway line. The Bretts Sawmill at Windsor also saw considerable timber traffic.

The Camp Mountain Accident

Soon after the end of the war in May of 1947, the worst railway accident in terms of loss of life occurred in Queensland, when a special May Day excursion to Dayboro left the rails near Camp Mountain railway station.² The decade of the 1940s was a traumatic time for the workers in the Mayne depot. The railway workers had played a major role in the defence of Australia and in many ways, a near heroic role in keeping the trains going. 1947 was a bad year for the Queensland Railways with another fatal accident involving a head-on collision taking place at Tamaree near Gympie.

The Camp Mountain train accident occurred on Monday, 5 May 1947—which was also the Labor Day public holiday. Dayboro was a popular area for picnics and the Railway Department frequently organised special excursions on the branch line. The Labor Day picnic had been organised for the Customs Department in Brisbane, and on 5 May 1947 was running to Closeburn on the Dayboro branch.

Three trains had been arranged to be out on the branch for the public holiday. The first of these was a special train (train number E17) for St Alban's Church of England Sunday School from Wilston (running express Wilston to Enoggera), and then for the Enoggera Methodist Circuit. The train was timetabled to depart Central Station at 8.57a.m. stopping at Brunswick Street and Mitchelton.

The next special train (E91) was to take passengers to Closeburn, with empty carriages to Dayboro, with the empty train departing at 4.30p.m. and returning at 5.10p.m. at Closeburn. This train was chartered by the Recreation and Social Club of the Department of Trade and Customs at Brisbane. The locomotive was C17 No. 824, with a water wagon (or gin) and six suburban passenger carriages. The train left Roma Street at 8.50a.m. and Central at 8.59 a.m, with

around 215 passengers on board. It crossed a suburban train at Newmarket at 9.14a.m., the Dayboro rail motor at 9.25a.m. and then at Mitchelton at 9.30a.m. it was running around 8 minutes late. After passing Ferny Grove station it commenced the climb of the Samford Range, with an estimated speed of between 6-12 miles an hour (travelling very slowly for the section). Between Ferny Grove and Samford the line climbed over a range which had 1 in 40 grades and 5 chain radius curves.

The train, on reaching the top of the bank after its climb up from Ferny Grove station towards Camp Mountain station, then began its descent. There was a downgrade (descent) of about two miles, with a series of curves, leading into a straight section, all on the downgrade. Descending towards Samford the train accelerated on a short straight and entered a sharp curve at excessive speed. It is possible that the driver was attempting to make up time (with the other special train now about 15 minutes behind). During the descent from the top of the bank, the driver had made a number of brake applications, on the Westinghouse air brake system, to retard the speed of the train.

Queensland Railways had experimented previously with the adoption of the Westinghouse brake system in the latter part of the 19th century, and had introduced the first train fully fitted with the gear in 1890. It was only at the outset in 1910 that a program to convert a large amount of its rollingstock to the Westinghouse system was begun.³ Unless the driver was fully trained in its operation and able to ensure that the air reservoirs throughout the train remained fully charged, then unfamiliarity with the system could lead to a mistake in its application. One of the worst examples of this was in the case of the Murphy's Creek smash, in January 1913. The driver had also overcharged the brakes on the descent of the Toowoomba range, leading to a train running into a group of railway employees who were attempting to clear the Main Range railway of a previously

derailed train not far from Murphy's Creek station. Six employees died as a result of this accident.

An inquiry into this accident recommended that young drivers be trained in the use of the Westinghouse brake on heavy ranges and that certificates of competence be issued before such drivers could be sent to work in these areas. The recommendation that such training be introduced was put into effect in 1922. Westinghouse brake training became an integral part of driver training, and after-hours schools were run by qualified enginemen to pass on the skills and knowledge important for safe operation of the system. However, the repeated use of the Westinghouse brake—without the opportunity for the air pump mounted on the locomotive to recharge the reservoirs on the locomotive—would lead to a case of overcharging.

At the bottom of the straight that led down from the Samford range there was a five chain (110 metre) radius curve to the left. Half-way round the bend, the leading carriage jumped the rails. Between this point and the end of the cutting the engine rolled over on its side and ploughed into the embankment. The tender carrying coal and water followed and dug in and the locomotive actually rolled onto its right hand side.

The 20-foot water gin was wrenched free from the tender, and was struck by the leading carriage; the body of the tank being telescoped back through the centre of the carriage, sweeping fittings, compartments and mangled bodies before it. The tank slewed out of the carriage about 10 feet from the end. Torn clear of the first car, the second carriage drove off the lines and embedded itself under the upturned tender, crushing the first two compartments ... The carriage twisted and overturned to the right, the rear end being flung into the air. In the front of the carriage were nine persons, six of whom were killed instantaneously and the remaining three trapped for nearly six hours.

Two of the carriages attached to a 'water gin' (water wagon carrying additional supplies for the engine) telescoped, crushing passengers. The front van (BUV 740) was destroyed, and the following carriage (BU 739), had two of its leading compartments destroyed. The ordinary length of the locomotive, water wagon, and three leading carriages, was around 239 feet. The result of the derailment and impact meant that the wreckage was compressed literally into a space half of that.

A second train was following the first excursion special, and the guard (Evans) on the wrecked train ran back to place red flags and lay detonators on the rails to warn the following train. This involved running back around a quarter of a mile. Immediately following the crash he had left his compartment and, after going to the top of the cutting, returned to the van and put on the handbrake. He also handed his First Aid kit to a passenger to take to the front of the train. Guard Evans established the derailment as occurring at 9.48a.m. and remained at the crash site until 5.30p.m.

Local farmers etc., alerted by the sound of steam escaping through the stub of the locomotive whistle, went quickly to the accident site. After the first call to QATB HQ, 18 ambulances were despatched within 70 minutes. The subsequent inquiry recognised the efforts of those involved, and in particular the work done by Guard Evans in protecting his train, and giving assistance at a time when 'in nervous shock.'

In many accounts of the Camp Mountain crash, one thing that is forgotten is that there was a third train that was due out on the line to Dayboro that day. The third train was hauled by a C17 class locomotive, with a water wagon, plus five coaches. This arrived at the crash site at 10.09a.m. The last three carriages of E91, the 'Camp Mountain' train were still 'on the road', the locomotive of the rear train was coupled to this. It

then tried to lift these three carriages, plus its own train, back towards Ferny Grove but was unable to do so. The locomotive then took its own train back to Ferny Grove and returned to the crash site to lift the three carriages left behind. It returned to Ferny Grove and later to Mayne.

The breakdown train had set out from Mayne at 11.00a.m., hauled by a PB15 class locomotive. It arrived at the crash site at 12.45p.m. and remained onsite until 6.15p.m.

The first picnic train was stranded at Samford. The driver and fireman remained on standby then had to walk from Samford to Ferny Gove. They arrived back at Mayne 6.15p.m. The train was 'locked in' at Samford until after clearing of the line was completed, and arrived back at Mayne at 6.30p.m., 7 May, 1947.⁴

The first man to leave for help was Edward Hart of Albion. When questioned after the accident, Hart said that:

The impact threw me against the window. The glass shattered and a lump of it cut me across the eye. I realised that something terrible had happened. All the women in the carriage were screaming. I climbed through the window and saw other people staggering from the wreckage.

Though bleeding profusely from the gash over his right eye, Hart managed (according to differing accounts), to stagger or run to Samford station and inform the railway employees there of the smash.

At Samford an emergency rescue gang was formed within a few minutes from local farmers and shopkeepers, who climbed into trucks and headed for the scene of the tragedy, as word of the smash began to spread

At the scene of the crash, uninjured passengers were assisting the less seriously injured out of the train. The first individuals who were not local, to reach the scene, were Sergeant J. Kunkel and Constable L. Fitch of Mitchelton, who received a phone

message a quarter of an hour after the tragedy from a nearby homestead. By 11.05a.m. 14 ambulances, including 6 called from the Brisbane Labor Day procession, and all available cars from the ambulance centre and others from Sandgate had arrived.

The first doctor on the scene (Dr. E. Marks) prepared a hypodermic morphia syringe which the ambulance men, crawling through the wreckage, administered to the passengers who remained conscious sufferers. Three doctors were rushed from the Brisbane General Hospital when it was thought that emergency operations would be necessary to save trapped passengers. However, no operations were necessary, and the doctors worked with the ambulance men.

The engine driver, Hind, was trapped inside the locomotive cab, bent almost double and had to administer the syringe to himself, as the ambulance man was unable to reach far enough. When the injections were completed, passengers, ambulance men and an emergency breakdown gang made a 'determined onslaught' on the wreckage.

Beneath the wheels of the overturned engine they found the body of the fireman. Later, with the arrival of more railway gangs, oxy-acetylene axes were brought into action in an effort to release the dead and injured. The standard method used by 'break-down crews' to gain access to the internal spaces of wooden-bodied carriages, was to cut away the top of carriages with axes and saws. In the case of the 'Camp Mountain' accident, the top of the first carriage, which was barring attempts of crews to reach the driver in the locomotive cab, was also cut into. Hind was conscious throughout the ordeal, and apparently assisted with a hacksaw during the rescue effort. At 3.30p.m. engine-driver Hind was lifted through a hole cut in the roof. He was by then unconscious, and was rushed to hospital. At 3.40p.m. the bodies of three children were also removed.

The last of the injured were taken to hospital; arriving at about 5.30p.m.

Throughout the afternoon, crowds that were variously estimated at between 400 and 600 lined the railway fences near the cutting to watch the rescue work. It was also estimated that more than 400 cars were turned back by the police from the road leading down to the railway line. During the afternoon a 'ghost' patrol car repeatedly warned morbid sightseers who encroached time and again on the rescue operations. In a testament to the toughness of those in that era, the uninjured from the train were moved to a nearby paddock, where they spread out under the trees and ate their picnic lunches.

According to news accounts, whilst the rescue efforts were underway, the Ashgrove parish Priest, Father D. Cronin, had also arrived at the crash site. He had reached the scene by car, after having been alerted to the accident apparently by a phone call. Father Cronin entered the wrecked carriages and administered the Last Rites to the dead during the progress of the rescue work. On one occasion, when crawling through the debris, he could only reach a woman's hand. On another, only a head was visible.

At the scene of the accident, a rescue communications centre was set up to co-ordinate the work of the railway personnel on site, plus police. The initial rescue task was to be abandoned at 8.00p.m. but, just before this, another body—that of a young girl—was found. Late into the night, when special lighting equipment had been arranged, the task of clearing the wreckage continued. Gangs working on the line had cleared it to allow for the passage—on Wednesday, 7 May, 1947—of the evening railmotor from Roma Street to Dayboro. There had been little damage to the rails themselves, with only two lengths of rail requiring replacement. Cars No. 742 and 739 were righted, placed back on the rails, and towed from the site.

The locomotive was also righted, placed back on the rails, and then towed back towards Mayne depot. Wreckage of the first carriage, the water wagon, and tender were all taken back to Mayne—but on flat wagons.

Fourteen passengers and the driver and fireman (16 in all) died and 38 passengers were injured. It was the first major accident since Traveston in 1925, which still remains the second most serious accident on the Queensland Railways, when 10 passengers were killed,

The Court of Inquiry that was convened in the aftermath of the accident sat for a total of 14 days. The final day of sitting was 9 June 1947, and 50 witnesses were examined. At the close of the inquiry, which began on 21 May 1947, the board had sat for sixty hours listening to the evidence and addresses which amounted to three bound volumes totalling 875 foolscap pages.

The board finally set out to view the wreck scene early in June to examine the castings on the tender bogie. There were also three visits made to the crash site: on 22nd and 28th May, and 11th June. On the first visit, the members of the Inquiry plus four witnesses and others, travelled by railmotor to the derailment location. The group then walked back alongside the line to the top of the range climb and met a special test train that was provided for the Inquiry. The purpose of this train was to compare the run of the Closeburn picnic train (E91) with that of a train run to regulation speed and timings on the section to Samford.

In evidence, James Brown, a Camp Mountain farmer who saw the train shortly before it left the rails, said the train was travelling faster than any train he had ever seen on the piece of track where the accident occurred. The train was making a screeching noise when coming down the range, which he heard from some distance away. There was common commentary made by witnesses in their testimony, in that it appeared there

had been no apparent attempt to brake the train during its run down from the top of the range. Other witnesses had said that the train had appeared to be travelling too quickly on the section.

However, the crucial testimony as to what had taken place in the final minutes of the journey on the down grade from the top of the range climb, was lost with the death of both the driver and fireman on the locomotive. The driver (H.C.Hind)—who succumbed to his injuries in hospital the following day—had recently transferred to Mayne depot, from Woolloongabba and had not worked beyond Ferny Grove. He had come from the northern division of the railways, and had been driving in Brisbane only a month before the smash. The driver did not know ‘the road’ and, as was permitted by the rules, was relying on a fireman who was sufficiently knowledgeable of the section. His fireman was A.C. Knight, who had been killed in the crash, instantly. He had passed the driver’s examination and had previously been a cleaner at Dayboro in the 1920s. His father had been Station Master at Mitchelton. The Court in its findings, accepted the fact that Knight was a competent fireman and acting driver and that he had proper knowledge of the line so as to enable him to tutor Hind on the train.

George Essex Evans—the Guard on the train and the only member of the train crew to survive the Camp Mountain rail crash—in giving evidence at the inquiry into the disaster, had said that the journey from Brisbane was uneventful to the bottom of the Samford Range. Before the day of the tragedy he had made three trips on the Dayboro branch line to learn the road; acting each time as an extra guard. He had also ‘worked’ two trains himself as a guard on that line, and he was satisfied he knew the road. On the climb up the Samford Range by the picnic train he stood by ready to apply his guard’s van brake in the event of the engine stalling. He stood by his testimony that

he felt the speed was not excessive. However, given the fact that the train was behind time after its slow climb to the top of the range, Evans had said that he felt it would have been unwise for him to 'pull the tap'; that is: make a brake application from his end of the train in his Guard's compartment.

The two major unions representing the crew—the Driver, the Fireman and the Guard—pursued their own theories as to the cause of the disaster. At the request of Mr Theo Kissick, for the AFULE (Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen), Mr Justice Mansfield ordered a search of the scene of the accident for the king pin of the tender's leading bogie. Kissick said it was important to see which was derailed first, the tender or the engine. Kissick's request that the measurement of both bogie centres be made, was also granted, to determine whether wear in this area had contributed to the disaster. Even up until the early 1990s there was still a contention amongst some of the former steam enginemen at the old Mayne locomotive depot, that 'evidence' showing that the locomotive was not fit for traffic, or had had some failure in the king pin or saddle pin for the leading bogie had disappeared between the accident site and Mayne depot.

However, an official reason and understanding of the cause of the derailment and eventual outcome, was attested to by several witnesses. Their belief, and ultimately that of the findings of the Inquiry was that the train reached the overturn speed of the tender shortly after entering the six chain curve at the bottom of the straight. Dr. Dino Anthony Morelli, lecturer in mechanical and aeronautical engineering at the University of Queensland, said in his evidence, that after examining the engine drawbar he concluded that the tender had turned over first. That would tend to roll the engine over. It appeared that nothing behind the tender had led to the accident. The evidence pointed very clearly, he thought, to the rear wheel of the rear

bogie having been derailed first. He had calculated that the train's overturn speed ranged from a minimum of 20 mph (35 kph), to a maximum of 51 mph, (around 80 kph). The actual speed would be nearer the maximum than the minimum, in which case possibly about 35 mph, (around 60 kph).

Overall there appeared to be a common agreement as to the underlying cause of the upset of the tender, and the derailment. In entering the curve, the overturn speed for the tender would have been reached, with the left hand wheels and left hand side of the tender lifting clear of the rails. In the driver's favour, it was found in the subsequent examination of the locomotive and tender that an emergency application of the Westinghouse braking system had been made. The brake handle and gear were all found in the emergency position, so during the final run down into the curve, Driver Hind had made an attempt to retard the speed of the train. As the emergency application 'kicked in', the rear bogie of the tender rotated clockwise, with the right hand wheel of the trailing bogie on the tender moving across the right hand rail, on the inside of the curve. Coal was spilled from the tender of the locomotive at this point. The tender continued to tilt, it revolved around the outer rail, and the top of the tender left scrape marks in the top of the cutting. The right hand rear axle box shattered several sleepers. Whilst the actual overturning speed for the engine itself had not been reached, it was the force of the torque on the drawbar of the engine, that caused it to overturn.

Behind the tender was the water wagon, carrying additional water supplies for the locomotive. The left hand buffer on the tender struck the right hand leading face of the water tank. The impact lifted the water tank from the underframe. The leading carriage (BUV 740) then struck the dislodged water tank, and the tank destroyed the wooden superstructure of the carriage above the steel frame. The underframe of the water wagon,

freed of its tank, continued forward with its bogies, and struck the bogies of the tender. The second carriage BU 739, then struck the first carriage, 'telescoping' into it, (collapsing the length of the carriage into a much smaller space), and then the carriage was flung up at an angle on the right hand side of the cutting.

In the aftermath of the Camp Mountain smash, there were, and still remain, a number of myths attending the cause of the disaster. These are still, sadly, quoted today. Some of these are that the crew were affected by alcohol, (all the crew were cleared of this), or that they were medically unfit for work on the day of the smash. Others that the locomotive was 'dangerous', or deemed unfit for traffic; all of which were discounted by the Inquiry. Another favourite is that the locomotive C17, No. 824, was scrapped after the accident or became some 'hoodoo locomotive.' Again, the opposite was the case. The locomotive was repaired, returned to traffic and operated in the old South-Eastern Division of the Queensland Railways; being transferred to Toowoomba and the South-Western Division in 1958. It was finally withdrawn from traffic in May, 1967. After its withdrawal No. 824 was towed to Roma, then to Injune, and today is resident in a park at Injune. Ironically, the branch line to Injune closed in 1967 and the locomotive was towed along the closed line to its final resting place, in a park, as part of a historical display incorporating the former railway station. All of the wrecked carriages, bar No. 740, were rebuilt, and 739 today sees service on Southern Downs Steam Railway heritage steam services, that operate from Warwick on the Southern Line, to Toowoomba or to Wallangarra.

The railway line was closed beyond Ferny Grove in July, 1955, due to declining traffic; long before any residential development beyond Keperra was being considered. However, still today the oft repeated comment is made, that the line was closed

‘because of the Camp Mountain crash.’ That comment is one that continues to resonate, and is one of the truly incorrect, if not illogical, statements that could be made about the events of that day; given a full eight years elapsed between the time of the accident and the closure of the railway.

Recently, I had occasion to walk over the length of former railway right of way between what was the location of the Camp Mountain station, and Ferny Grove railway station, and mentally re-enact the events of that day in May, courtesy of the findings of the Inquiry.

Today, the vast majority of that section is now Lanita Road and Maclean Road South and cars traverse where steam trains and old red rail motors used to operate. The former right of way has been covered in asphalt, and widened for modern vehicles. The site of the crash has been marked by a rock cairn, placed by the Samford Historical Society & Museum, and is visited by people walking and cycling along the way.

In the section of the Samford Conservation Park, the old railway formation now exists as a rail trail, and it is here in amongst the bushland setting that the imagination can start to appreciate some of the events of the day. The curves leading to the top of the climb in both directions and the closeness of the cutting walls, all give an approximation of the right of way, and how it appeared those many years ago.

From the top of the climb up from Ferny Grove, to where the line then begins its downwards descent, it is still easy to trace the last journey of the picnic train that gathered pace down the long straight, and into Queensland railway legend.

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Greg is a graduate and postgraduate student of the University of Queensland, he has recently completed a Masters thesis on the life of Colonel Charles Evans, CMG, Queensland Commissioner for Railways, 1911-18.

ENDNOTES:

1. *Brisbane Courier*, Monday, 1 July 1918, p.6.
2. QSA: HB 275, *Camp Mountain Disaster*. A/ 9356. See also Report of Court of Inquiry, 1947, Parliamentary Papers 1947-48, 1, 1033.
3. J.D. Kerr, *Triumph of Narrow Gauge: A History of Queensland Railways*, Brisbane, Boolarong , 1998, p. 77.
4. QSA: HB 275, *Camp Mountain Disaster*. A/ 9356. See also Report of Court of Inquiry, 1947, Parliamentary Papers 1947-48, 1, 1033.